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This article inquires into the “calculative practices” that are used to regulate quality 
in higher education. After providing a historical snapshot of the antecedents of quality 
regimes, I discuss university ranking systems (league tables) and the UK’s Research 
Assessment Exercise. I ask two questions: first, what do the visibilities of quality 
conceal, and second, what possible effects are quality regimes having on notions of 
“proper” academic identity? That the quality agenda in higher education is tied to a 
collective national and institutional aspiration to be internationally competitive is 
generally recognised as an outcome of neoliberalisation. I argue that there is a need 
to go beyond considering neoliberalism as an ideology imposed from above. Rather, 
the techniques aimed at building a competitive, dynamic and accountable higher 
education system in countries like Australia and the UK are premised on creating 
flexible identities for academic professionals, using their powers of freedom to further 
their individual desires, self-interest and self-advancement. This has consequences for 
the knowledge cultures fostered by higher education institutions. 
[Key words: universities, quality, governmentality, neoliberal technologies, performance 
measurement] 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the two decades since the quality juggernaut swept through the education world, the 
disciplinary effects of quality systems have been associated with limitations in autonomy and 
academic freedom, bureaucratisation and threats to the public good responsibilities of universities 
(Currie et al., 2003; Henkel, 2005; Morley, 2005; Shore & Wright, 1999). Recent policy shifts 
have seen the last Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) in the UK and the introduction of a 
revised research performance initiative, Excellence in Research in Australia (ERA) in place of the 
Research Quality Framework (RQF). These developments would suggest the need to re-visit 
issues of quality and accountability in higher education. In this paper, I examine key “calculative 
practices” used to regulate quality in higher education. I discuss the effects of practices such as 
university rankings and research performance on the identities of academics and the knowledge 
cultures they are fostering. 
The article is organised as follows. In section one I offer a historically situated sketch of key 
“counting and calculative” practices such as audit, benchmarking and standard-setting, which are 
at the heart of many contemporary quality systems. These techniques have mutated from localised 
processes of improvement to global technologies used for competitive and strategic advantage. 
Then in section two, I focus on two sets of contemporary calculative practices, university rankings 
and research performance measurement. I outline the problems associated with university 
rankings as a quality measure to determine missions, and the knowledge cultures fostered in 
British universities by the research performance exercise known as the RAE. As an instrument of 
“New Public Management” and neoliberal state building, more broadly, the RAE is revealing of 
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how neoliberal ideas and practices came to be embodied by individual academics, departments 
and universities. In section three titled “Neoliberal seduction”, I revisit the limitations associated 
with using existing quality mechanisms to build the research-active academic identity and the 
globally positioned university, arguing that if we are to resist their negative effects we need to 
shift analytical attention away from their disciplinary effects to the myriad ways in which they 
legitimise particular identities for academic staff.  
Theoretically, this article has been informed by governmentality, an empirical framework which 
is notable for revealing the contingency of practices of governance such as the quality schemes 
discussed in this paper. Governmentality offers insights which are important to counter notions of 
inevitability and defeatism that routinely accompany pronouncements that quality management 
systems such as university rankings, league tables and research are “here to stay”.  
CALCULATIVE PRACTICES 1: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Situating the metrological imperative 
Michael Power reminds us “the urge to quantify and to measure has a long and complex history” 
(2004: 766). Writing from a European perspective, he locates the emergence of counting, 
measurement and probabilistic reasoning to the 13th century. The “metrological mood” which 
now defines western rationality was only loosely related to the high ideals of mathematical or 
scientific purity, drawing momentum instead from the social laboratories of gambling houses, 
markets, and merchants’ ledgers (Ibid: 766). By the 18th century the invention of more 
sophisticated instruments of measurement such as clocks, barometers, and thermometers created 
the conditions for greater emphasis on precision in measurement. In the 19th century states used 
various counting and classification techniques to manage populations, both those within their 
borders and those subject populations in colonies and protectorates. Knowledge rested on the 
development of “quantificatory epistemes”—objects and events were ordered in ways which 
suppressed their differences and measurements were applied with the aim of establishing 
connections between them. Practices such as surveying and mapping, for example, identified and 
quantified resources for exploitation. Populations once enumerated, classified and territorially 
using instruments, such as surveys and census, could become targets of intervention (Kalpagam, 
2000).  
Unlike ethnographic knowledge, which seeks to represent the uniqueness of “otherness”, statistics 
transform otherness into differences that can be measured and compared (Ibid: 43). Power 
observes, “to render something countable, a level of abstraction from specific qualities is 
required; categories of similarities had to be observed” (2004: 767). There is a rich body of 
literature about the political controversies underpining classification schemes. Bowker and Star’s 
(1999) analysis of the epistemic struggles underpinning the classification of diseases is one such 
work. Power’s historical analysis leads him to conclude that measurement and countability are 
desired by those in authority long before reliable instrumentation is developed. Thus, although no 
reliable means existed of measuring categories such as “value added” and “operational risk”, 
calculative technologies such as accounting have been enlisted and reformed in the service of 
measuring these categories with mixed results (Ibid: 769). Measurement is given a visible and 
transparent public face, but this transparency is not a “natural effect of performance measurement, 
rather it reflects the influence of specific epistemic communities” (Ibid: 770, emphasis added). 
So far the discussion has highlighted some of the problems that emerge with first order 
measurement—the institutions of classification that make counting possible and give categories 
their naturalness. Calculative technologies should not be regarded as neutral practices—they are 
shaped by forces and processes of power and knowledge. To address their shortcomings, attempts 
have been made to modify measurement systems so as to accommodate greater complexity and 
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sensitivity. Measurement has subsequently been extended to new domains, including spheres of 
tacit knowledge. Paradoxically, the mania for measurement means that areas once considered 
domains of human judgement are being colonised by metrics. In other words, “making the 
incommensurable commensurable”, opens up an ever-increasing set of possibilities for 
managerial intervention.  
There are also problems associated with second order measurement or meta-measurement. Second 
order measurement involves the aggregation of numbers through statistical and mathematical 
operations of ratios and indices, such as averages, correlations, and measures of dispersions. 
These become part of an institutionalised policy world and end up having a life of their own 
(Power, 2004: 772). Second-order measures form the basis of “global” knowledges that are 
increasingly used to compare or benchmark organisations, countries, and regions against each 
other (Ibid: 772). As second order measures are normalised, they are often applied in largely 
unqualified forms, ending up as techniques of long-distant control between remote centres of 
calculation and interventions in organisations (Ibid: 772–773).  
Power concludes, “Performance measurement systems function to define performance, direct 
management attention and induce behavioural change, rather than represent phenomena 
faithfully” (Ibid: 776). While acknowledging the general cultural acceptance of numbers in most 
aspects of everyday life, he argues for a critical role for experts: 
The task of social science is to open up the black box of performance measurement 
systems, . . . to denaturalise them and to recover the social and political work that has 
gone into their . . . construction as instruments of control. (Power 2004: 778) 
What follows is a brief description of two calculative techniques—benchmarking and audit—both 
of which now have a salient role in university life. My intention here is to adopt a nuanced 
approach to the quality agenda which includes recognising the “productive” possibilities it might 
present for individuals and organisations. 
Audits: Checking for Quality 
As a key technique that is used to assure quality, audit is noted for its reliance on practices of 
surveillance. To its defenders audit regimes provide an administrative and pragmatic transparency 
that make the quality of products and services visible. To its critics, audits create “managerial 
proceduralism” which has negative consequences for trust (Ibid: 771). Marilyn Strathern (2000) 
suggests that although audits  are publicised by governments as instruments of accountability and 
trust, their meta regulatory functions mean that they are more likely to function as “rituals of 
verification” and “certificates of comfort”. Put simply, the audit rests on an inherent paradox: It is 
promoted as an instrument of accountability based on the view that auditees cannot be trusted to 
do their jobs but the same audited subjects are expected to be trusted to prepare honest auditable 
accounts of their work (Charlton, 1998; see also Shore & Wright, 1999). 
Standardisation and Benchmarking: from “local” to “global” comparisons 
As a calculative practice, benchmarking, essentially a technique of comparing, is noted for its 
reliance on performance statistics. Benchmarking is not recent; practices of comparing to identify 
a standard of quality can be traced to the pre-modern civilizations of Egypt, Sumeria and Rome 
where attempts were made to standardise and benchmark stones, wooden gouges and chariot axles 
(Higgins & Tamm Hallstrom, 2007; Thonhauser & Passmore, 2006). Standardisation and 
benchmarking gained momentum with the emergence of industrial capitalist models of 
production. Seeking to improve industrial efficiency, and promising to re-write relations between 
labour and capital, engineers such as FW Taylor and Henri Fayol used foundational knowledge 
from their parent discipline to contribute to the development of a new discipline—management 
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(Higgins & Tamm Hallstrom: 691). It can be argued then that engineering and management 
functioned as vanguard disciplines in facilitating global flows of knowledge on benchmarking, 
standardisation and performance measurement. Significantly, they exerted their effects largely 
through a series of horizontal linkages across industries rather than through vertical, state-driven 
policy associations although key events such as the two world wars and the Cold War witnessed 
closer steering by states of knowledge production systems. 
Benchmarking and standardisation remained largely national in focus even though international 
standard setting bodies such as the International Standards Organisation (ISO) started to gain 
prominence after the Second World War. Benchmarking against international standards rose in 
prominence in the early 1980s, facilitated by a series of revolutionary technological changes, 
rapid economic integration, and the drive to liberalise trade. The prominence of competitive  
benchmarking and strategic benchmarking was partly facilitated by concerns in the 1980s about 
the decline of American competitiveness especially in relation to Japan (Larner & Le Heron, 
2005). A watershed moment in global benchmarking was the move in 1970 by the ISO to go from 
issuing recommendations to publishing standards. Another event of significance was the 1987 
publication of ISO 9000, which set in train a global trade in management standards and 
certification. ISO 9000 facilitated and furthered the internationalisation of labour manufacturing; 
it also created the conditions for the emergence of international management and accounting 
standards, a development which was portrayed as reducing the risks involved in strategic alliances 
and merges and acquisitions by firms (Higgins & Tamm Hallstrom, 2007). By the 1990s, then,  
benchmarking had mutated from a set of practices of internal comparison to enable product 
improvements by a firm to a set of practices that used international or global points of reference. 
The globalisation of competitive benchmarking which compared across industries and across 
nations was also enabled by university business schools, using the now universal management 
case study approach (Higgins & Tamm Hallstrom, 2007; Larner & Le Heron, 2004; Mattli & 
Buthe, 2003).  
The effects of organisations like the ISO as agents of globalisation, working through nationally-
situated, voluntary technical committees is the source of a small number of studies. Boli and Loya 
(1999) draw on a functionalist “world society” sociology to conclude that benchmarking against a 
universal best practice is the means for various stakeholders to acheive modernity, progress and 
egalitarianism. Accordingly, international standard setting and benchmarking are portrayed as an 
apolitical sphere, devoid of contestation and conflict. By contrast, those working from a “realist” 
tradition of social science consider benchmarking and standard setting as signs of the political and 
economic might of particular states in setting the agenda. This view is also analytically limiting 
especially given that global standards bodies such as the ISO base their legitimacy on consensual 
and voluntary participation and the offer of technically optimal solutions. Higgins and Tamm 
Hallstrom (2007) and Larner and Le Heron (2004), on the other hand, argue that quality assurance 
standards such as the the generic and abstract ISO 9000 and the management practices that they 
sponsor function not by encouraging better products or services but by providing the context for 
corporations, professionals and individuals to constantly re-make themselves according to 
comparative data. 
Universities have played their part in benchmarking and standardisation. Some subscribe to ISO 
standardisations to assure stakeholders of the world-class, international status of their services. 
This factor and greater industry representation on university academic boards, industry liaisons 
including the influence of professional associations, as well as the rise of New Public 
Management, have contributed to the arrival of a benchmarking rationality in higher education. 
The ISO’s recently inaugurated Award for Higher Education Standardization recognises the 
contribution of universities to standardisation, a process also acknowledged by the ISO as a tool 
for “making world markets accessible” (ISO 2007: online). Additionally, universities subscribe to 
global standards and practices through their memberships of various standardising organisations, 
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by aligning themselves with accreditations regimes and more recently through their desire to 
participate in various league tables. University business schools, for example, increasingly 
benchmark against the standards of organisations such as the American Association to Advance 
Collegiate Schools of Business and the European Foundation for Business Management to 
improve their competitive positioning in an overcrowded market for business education. All of 
these practices can be said to contribute towards the globalisation of systems of quality.  
This brief account illustrates how benchmarking has gone from a technique concerned with 
internal comparisons to an “aspirational technology” aimed at embedding an ethos of continuous 
improvement and international competitiveness. Benchmarking’s power rests on it mutability. 
Although it was once used to compare like with like, it is now deployed in the service of 
comparing “organisationally discrete and spatially disparate objects” in the service of attaining 
(inter)national competitiveness (Larner & Le Heron, 2004: 215). In recent times, there have been 
calls for global benchmarking models in higher education, the argument being that where once 
national regulation frameworks were adequate to govern quality, in light of student mobilities and 
the use of information and communication technologies to deliver education programs, there is 
now a need to re-scale quality mechanisms. Global referencing systems such as global university 
rankings are increasingly promoted by organisations like the World Bank as benchmarks for 
quality (Salmi & Saroyan, 2006). The assumptions underpinning this position resonate with 
themes from earlier debates on globalisation—the limitations of the machineries of the nation-
state and the need for “readability” for a wider group of stakeholders and transparency in the 
global marketplace. However, many of the norms and standards labelled global are not context-
less—ultimately they come from somewhere (Larner & Le Heron, 2004, 2005). For example, the 
“global” norms used by league tables that identify the world’s best universities are drawn from 
the technoscience-oriented, English-speaking, and more specifically elite American and British 
research-oriented universities (Marginson & van der Wende, 2007). They may be appropriate 
benchmarks in some instances, but not in others.  
To conclude, benchmarking is not a passive, or neutral technique. It shapes expectations, 
behaviours and values; it contributes towards the development of new organisational principles, 
and new professional subjectivities (Larner & Le Heron, 2004). Benchmarking resonates easily 
with intellectual work as it rests on a context of constant learning, and improvement. However, it 
risks departing from the scholarly realm when the imperative to measure comes to govern all 
other considerations.  
Calculating Quality in Higher Education:  Contemporary Practices 
University Ranking Tables 
National rankings of higher education institutions made their first commercial debut in 1984 in 
the United States when the magazine US News and World Report produced a “good universities” 
guide. 
The limitations of league tables have been well studied and elaborated and will only be briefly 
visited here (see Marginson & van der Wende, 2007; Usher & Savino, 2006). It should be stressed 
that some of the harshest criticisms of league tables apply to national ranking systems that have 
been devised by commercially-oriented media companies. Briefly, the most common flaw in 
national (and global rankings) is poor construct validity.  League tables rarely succeed in 
comparing like with like given the quite significant diversity between and within institutions even 
if attempts are made to get as close a fit as possible, as is the case with the more reputable global 
rankings systems. What is concealed by these comparisons is the problem identified earlier in the 
paper, namely the abstraction of specific differences and construction of similarities in order to 
render universities rank-able. Second, league tables assign weightings in what is ultimately an 
arbitrary manner as no league table can take into account all quality perspectives for all interest 
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groups given the multiplicity of stakeholders involved in higher education. Under existing reward 
structures we can expect academics to rate universities for research, while students and parents 
will rate them for teaching, positional status and employability or graduate outcomes (Marginson 
& van der Wende, 2007). 
The two most prominent worldwide university rankings are the Shanghai Jiao Tong Academic 
Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) developed in 2003, and the Times Higher Education 
Supplement’s World University Rankings (THES), published in 2004. ARWU is not a holistic 
ranking of universities. Instead it emphasises elite science research and, in doing so, it classifies 
research as the single most important determinant of university reputation (Liu and Cheng, 2005). 
This focus is hardly accidental given that ARWU was initially devised to benchmark China’s 
universities against world-class norms to enable them to make up for time lost as a result of the 
country’s political upheavals. Unlike the THES which relies on data obtained from universities 
and from e-mail surveys, ARWU uses an index with the following weightings: citation in leading 
journals (20%), articles in Science and Nature (20%), number of highly cited researchers as 
determined by Thomson’s ISI index (20%), and winners of Nobel prizes in the sciences and 
economics (30%) (Liu and Cheng, 2005). Why a 30 per cent weighting for Nobel laureates and 
then why for prizes won in the sciences/economics but not peace or literature? That China seeks 
to benchmark against existing indices of “excellence” instead of using its growing geopolitical 
and geoeconomic profile to establish different indices is also noteworthy. It suggests that the 
discursive practices that have underwritten the knowledge cultures of Anglo-Saxon scientific 
imperialism and fundamentalism are unlikely to be challenged, at least not in the short term. 
Because it privileges elite science research, relying heavily on Thomson Scientific’s coverage of 
highly cited researchers (HiCi), ARWU does not rank institutions specialising only in the Social 
Sciences and Humanities as well as those that specialise only in the fields of science, technology 
and medicine. Also as with the major media-based league tables, ARWU’s rankings deploy 
measures of citation which privilege research conducted in the English-speaking world. Research 
results from the non-English speaking world do not score as high on citation rates, as they are not 
published in English-language journals to the same extent, conferring English-speaking 
universities with competitive advantage because of their language (Marginson & van der Wende, 
2007). 
In sum, there are indicators that ARWU has mutated from an instrument originally devised to 
provide international comparative data to further China’s national development into something 
else. ARWU holds out ambiguous possibilities including the chances that governments of middle 
educational powers such as Australia will streamline research funding to create one or two 
national universities with global elite status. Rankings also have the potential to create the 
conditions for institutionalised performativity. The ARWU index is less subjective than the THES 
rankings (discussed below), however, like many performance measurements, it is flawed, and 
should not be promoted as the solution to problems of quality in higher education. 
THES’ World University Rankings, the other significant worldwide ranking system, compares 
poorly with ARWU on most indices. It privileges reputation and uses an opinion survey of 
academics as its methodology, giving a 40 per cent weighting to their views. At one level, this 
type of measurement appears positive in that it acknowledges the importance of experts in the 
ranking of top universities. However, given the geographic unevenness in the quality of global 
knowledge networks, evident in the dominance of the English-language journals and English 
speakers within journal editorial boards, it is inevitable then that the THES rankings assume a bias 
towards the English-speaking world (Marginson & van der Wende, 2007). In addition, 20 per cent 
weightings are given to research citations per staff member (using the Thomson data base) and 20 
per cent to staff-student ratios, regarded as a proxy measure for teaching quality. A 10 per cent 
weighting is accorded to the findings of employers; 5 per cent each for international students and 
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international staff. The emphasis on internationalisation is less a quality measure and rewards 
those institutions that are active in cross-border trade in education rather than those which have 
highly selective processes to attract quality international students. Marginson and van der Wende 
thus conclude that this composition bias favours the UK and Australia which end up with better-
than-deserved rankings. 
Where then can the concept of university rankings take us? The answer inevitably rests with 
which stakeholder responds to this question. For sections of Chinese academe benchmarking 
against a set of global norms creates possibilities to depoliticise research and intellectual work 
more generally, to reduce the influence of patronage politics and to slide away from the 
stranglehold of a state with a history of animosity towards intellectual freedom. Similar 
sentiments are expressed in countries like Malaysia where a racialised governmentality has been 
associated with weakening the missions of national universities. The prevailing rationality in 
sections of the Australian policy and higher education community is that comparative 
information—common data sets—are necessary to secure financial resources and legitimacy from 
the state, and to improve market positioning of Australian universities in a competitive global 
education market. As a consequence, rankings are critiqued, and thereafter suggestions are made 
to innovate and reform them with better measures rather than adopting the more radical 
alternative of abandoning rankings altogether. University rankings are thus becoming naturalised 
and taken for granted by epistemic communities. 
The United States is associated with some of the more extreme manifestations of university 
league tables, “winner-takes-all” markets—those which allocate substantial rewards to a small 
and select group at the top end of the market (Frank & Cook, 1996). League tables have 
consolidated and strengthened the gatekeeper role of elite educational institutions for society’s 
most sought after jobs (Ibid: 12). Public institutions increasingly mimic the behaviours of elite 
institutions in order not to be eclipsed in importance, bidding aggressively for staff deemed to 
have “market value”. These practices are associated with escalating the costs of higher education 
while contributing to socioeconomic stratification in the student body. Where once universities 
provided needs-based financial aid, this practice has been eclipsed by the desire for students who 
could boost league table ratings. “Merit based financial aid” is increasingly used to justify 
financial assistance to students from higher socioeconomic backgrounds (Kirp, 2003), a practice 
that is also being emulated by key Australian universities. The American experience suggests that 
market-sponsored notions of quality and seemingly neutral instruments like media-inspired 
university rankings which are ostensibly formulated to sell more magazines and newspapers have 
undermined gains in equity and social justice.  
Some of the worst excesses of winner-take-all markets are materialised in the practices of 
American business schools, which routinely alter their behaviours to achieve high scores in 
magazine-generated league tables. According to Frank and Cook (1996), critical comments from 
one graduating class led the University of Virginia’s Darden Business School to write to the next 
class cohort to be evaluated by the Business Week magazine to remind them that their evaluations 
could have direct repercussions on the economic value of their degrees. In this case, the 
calculative rationalities of league tables have been embraced and institutionalised by multiple 
stakeholders, all acting under the aegis of self-interest. 
A further warning against calculative practices that are commercially driven emerges from 
Rakesh Khurana’s timely and historical analysis of American business schools. Titled From 
Higher Aims to Hired Hands, Khurana (2007) puts forward the provocative viewpoint that 
business schools have re-constructed themselves into sophisticated trade schools whose mission is 
to facilitate access to elite networks and credentials and prepare students for careers that create 
private wealth for themselves and for shareholders. Business Schools have lost any sense of their 
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societal responsibilities to professionalise the discipline of management and to enable 
management practitioners to contribute to good citizenship.  
Perhaps the most salient and formalised of quality system in higher education is the UK’s 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), a state-driven initiative, which is now discussed.  
The Research Assessment Exercise: Reformulating Experts and Expertise 
The introduction of the RAE has to be read against the emergence of “New Public Management”, 
which was formulated to overcome the interventionist liberal welfare state in the United 
Kingdom. The expensive, cumbersome “social state” had to be renovated into an “enabling state” 
where mass education could be provided at a greatly reduced unit cost (Shore & Wright, 1999). 
This required changes to academic work to make it a more flexible enterprise, and corresponding 
changes to academic identities (Henkel, 1999, 2005). At the same time, there was a need to 
encourage new regimes of calculation premised on competition, accountability and consumer 
satisfaction. 
It was in this context of managerial and bureaucratic accountability that the Research Assessment 
Exercise was introduced in 1986. The original architect of the RAE, Professor Peter Swinerton-
Dyer, then chairman of the University Grants Committee observed:  
[The] situation was ok when there was a lot of money in the system but when the big 
squeeze of the 1980s came, we had to find a system for justifying the allocation of 
money. It . . . had to be fair but certainly not egalitarian, as research quality varied 
enormously in universities. (cited by Major, 2001: online) 
Swinerton-Dyer would later confess surprise at the longevity of the RAE as he devised it as a 
temporary measure. From its relatively modest beginnings in 1986, where 50 universities 
participated and academics submitted their five best papers, by 2001 some 200,000 papers were 
offered for assessment. The RAE had become a very costly mechanism to decide how to disburse 
research funding. The direct costs of administering the 2001 RAE were estimated at £5.6 million 
(A$17 million), while the indirect costs were estimated at £45 million (A$135 million). The 2001 
RAE found some 55 per cent of universities were in the 5-5* range—the highest tier of 
performance, with 80 per cent of institutions being ranked in the 4-5* range (Major 2001). Amidst 
Treasury reports that there would be not be sufficient money to support all of the high achievers, 
the 2008 RAE was declared to be the last. Subsequently a cheaper, metrics based system would be 
utilized that would be less reliant on peer review and would draw more heavily on statistics 
(Lipsett, 2007).  
For its supporters, the RAE’s primary strength was its unique peer review system that allowed 
academic staff to exercise judgment over quality, ahead of other forms of measurement that might 
have been mechanistic and formulaic (Bekhradnia, 2000). For some in the post-92 universities, 
the RAE challenged the traditional intellectual hierarchies which excluded the “new” universities 
from participating in the creation of knowledge. No longer restricted to being purveyors of 
knowledge, the RAE enabled post-92 institutions and their academics to compete for funding, 
recognition, and prestige with generally positive consequences for growing their esteem and that 
of their graduates (Fullbrook, 2000). Some saw the RAE as promoting interdisciplinary work, 
others were undecided. Those departments which emerged successful regarded the Exercise as 
less costly time-wise, and enabling greater discretion than that afforded by normal grant applying 
rituals. In a climate of fiscal restraint, the argument made was that the RAE enabled policymakers 
to identify and direct resources to centres of excellence which in turn would attract top 
researchers, and maintain the international competitiveness of individual departments, universities 
and UK research more generally (Beringer, 2000). The RAE was also credited as enabling the 
management of research in strategic and effective ways, and in doing so, making the United 
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Kingdom into “a successful, research-intensive society”. Portraying the United Kingdom in heroic 
terms, the RAE’s supporters argued that the country produced eight per cent of the world’s 
scientific papers and nine per cent of world citations despite having only one per cent of the 
world’s population (O’Prey, 2000). 
To its critics, the RAE presented philosophical and practical objections. It created the conditions 
for safe mediocrity; it encouraged the publication of work before it was ready and hence 
diminished quality; it distorted the rhythms of research and encouraged short-termism as 
researchers selected projects that could be completed and published within the five-year period 
(Power, 2000; Martindale, 2000). RAE culture within universities was criticised for perpetuating 
disadvantage of women researchers and young scholars particularly those with family 
responsibilities, as it treated every five-year period in an academic’s career equally (Martindale, 
2000; see also Morley, 2005). The RAE culture was also implicated in reducing the commitment 
of university medical schools to clinical education. Academics engaged in this type of work were 
seen as “dragging down” university departments because they prioritised clinical education ahead 
of research (Mumford, 2000). A similar perspective criticised the RAE for “swinging the balance 
damagingly away from teaching” and supervision by subordinating everything to publishing 
(Bernard, 2000). In a similar vein, Strathern (2000) argues that the performance culture fostered 
by the RAE has discouraged indigenous forms of evaluation, producing a social climate that 
encourages “performance hype”. She notes, “Whether with students’ examinations or colleagues’ 
papers, selectivity is crucial to the academic enterprise and one has to be prepared to say that 
things are no good” (Ibid: 139).  
British publishers associated the RAE with article obesity—huge increases in the quantity of 
articles submitted for publication—which put significant pressures on reviewing procedures, 
delivery dates and schedules. RAE-savvy academics were criticised for offering work prematurely 
and being unwilling to complete revisions recommended by series editors and advisors. In some 
instances publishers lost books for insisting on revisions, and in other cases, publishers 
capitulated to the moral pressures “since careers and departmental resources were affected”. In 
attempting to measure quality, the RAE came to be seen as lowering quality (Mynott, 2000).  
In 2006, the House of Commons and the House of Lords heard about the RAE’s association with 
these criticisms and a range of other perverse institutional and individual behaviours. Members of 
both Houses (several such as Baroness Sharp, Lord Giddens, and Lord Desai who were former 
academics) heard of journal editorial boards that privileged the citation impacts of their journals 
ahead of reporting new and original research. Research quality was now re-defined as publication 
in a prestigious journal. The primary concern of the most adroit players in the research 
performance games was to write for so-called experts and to be cited by them. Practices of self-
citation were said to be flourishing and “article obesity” was associated with disrupting the timely 
exchanges of research findings.  
CONCLUDING COMMENTS: NEOLIBERAL SEDUCTION? 
So how can we understand the widespread uses of practices of quality assurance in higher 
education? In trying to make sense of these developments, it is important not to hearken back to a 
mythical era before quality management when scholars were academically free to produce 
excellent teaching and research. That stated, there is a need to acknowledge that performance 
measurement systems rarely adhere to their blueprints; that the effects of these regimes remain 
contingent and unpredictable, thus creating opportunities for resistance. At the same time, it is 
now clear that it is inadequate simply to dismiss the various quality systems and strategies as 
ideological and examples of disciplinary neoliberalism. This analysis has its place but I would 
argue that there is an urgency to go beyond the idea of audits and benchmarking as agentless 
disciplinary instruments. We need new ways of analysing and resisting the kind of knowledge 
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cultures that are fostered by audit technologies and global benchmarking. This requires us to re-
examine the complex ways in which identities are moulded to support and legitimise neoliberal 
ways of acting and being. Academic audits like the RAE and the now jettisoned RQF cannot 
function properly without voluntary compliance and self-policing. Indeed as Power observes, 
“academics and their institutions are colluding in the very processes that they are criticizing” 
(2000: 135).  
The literature on quality, then, does not give sufficent importance to the roles played by other 
‘modalities of power’—the desire for self-advancement, the seductiveness of participating (and 
for some, winning) in competitive games such as bidding for and winning ever more grants and 
consultancies, notching up more books and journal articles, and the competitive impulses that 
increasingly inform the remunerations of trophy professors and executive managers. The issue of 
patronage—how excellence is increasingly framed by patronage is also an area that so far has 
been understudied. For Charlton, audits like the RAE create “pathologies of creative compliance” 
with dire consequences for the scientific disciplines: “successful scientists are those who develop 
survival skills to demonstrate their attainment of targets and games are played around an indicator 
culture where auditable performance is an end in itself and real long-term planning” (1998: 252).  
At the heart of the processes that underpin quality technologies is a kind of flexible professional 
identity with the will and ability to invest in practices which bring maximum returns to the self 
even while criticising the technologies of rule that steer one towards the market. The competitive 
anxiety of not being left behind, along with the capacity to re-make themselves using performance 
statistics has created spaces for self-advancement for a select but growing group of academics 
who have the capacities to deploy the “powers of freedom”, or in Baroness Sharp’s words, “play 
the game”. Taking a similar stance, Power thus writes about the RAE savvy academic who is: 
professionally focused on career development, and making the right moves, strategic 
in terms of thinking about publication, highly promotion conscious, confident and 
demanding  in personal negotiations about finances, teaching and administrative loads. 
They are . . . Thatcher’s children, conscious and confident of their bargaining position 
in the RAE-system. (Power 2000: 136)  
Although Australia has used less intrusive forms of performance measurements, we cannot 
discount the possibility of similar effects. The career paths forged by those who direct their 
energies towards the new habitus required by the managerial and evaluative university require 
ceaseless networking, ever more marketing of the self, and constant (re)positioning. Those who 
embrace the symbolic capital demanded of the managerial university can expect a fairly rapid 
ascent through the hierarchy. They can replace the grinding hard work and rewards associated 
with teaching and supervising students with a range of abilities, with credentialising them in an 
efficient manner.  
In her comments on the UK higher education sector, Deem (2006: 219) warns against a university 
where who one knows becomes more important than the what and the how of university work.  
There are signs that the contemporary Australian university in Australia has foregrounded certain 
professional identities for its academic staff in order to ensure its survival:  they should be rational 
and self-interested, flexible, have market-ready attributes, or at the very least have the aptitude to 
cultivate market attributes; they should also be spatially mobile with the vision to grasp 
opportunities wherever they might be. These aspirations, informed and propelled by mundane 
practices such as performance measurements of productivity and efficiency in their various guises 
have played their part in enabling the large-scale, state-initiated interventions that we label 
“neoliberalism” to be adopted so widely and readily.  
Naturally, a range of contrasting subjectivities are also implicated in the contemporary university, 
the recalcitrant “unproductive” and “difficult” academic who won’t play along with the rankings 
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and citational games and deals with the consequences of being left behind on the professional 
ladder; the overworked, poorly paid, casual staff member who despite the right credentials is 
relegated to sessional teaching work, disciplined by a plethora of timesheets and casual contracts; 
the student who is constructed by university executive managers as a mobile, discerning, choice 
maker, seeking convenience and a value-for-money degree who was to be kept “happy” and non-
complaining. Under existing circumstances, credentialising such a student has come to be the 
more efficient endeavour than investing the time to enable deep learning.  
According to Rose (1999), the management of the liberal state from the 18th century onwards 
required empowered experts who would establish particular sets of social norms and thereafter act 
upon individuals accordingly. This was an approach to government that secured order and yet 
enabled liberty in matters relating to the economy. Advanced liberal governance, on the other 
hand, requires experts to assemble, use and disseminate new technologies of rule, using freedom, 
self-interest and self-advancement. It requires experts to participate in processes, and produce 
knowledges, values and norms that are broadly supportive of market citizenship. 
If as argued by many that we are well on our way to an era beyond modernity, whether these 
collective transformations are described as the knowledge economy, postindustrial society, 
information society, or risk society, what can we observe about the cultures that give symbolic 
meaning to practices such as league tables and the RAE, the “knowledge cultures” so to speak 
that make up the knowledge society? We might want to ask as Knorr-Cetina (2007) does, what 
kinds of social, political and economic lives are fostered by this kind of knowledge culture? And 
how will the epistemic environments in our universities shape the macro-epistemic context of 
society?  
The first tentative steps to securing change in universities might involve critical scholarly 
attention to practices such as research performance exercises and league tables, taking into 
account the modalities of power that shape the ‘successful’ researcher and academic. O’Farrell’s  
(2007: 26) “modest suggestions” of how to resist the managed university are also useful: a refusal 
to play along with performativity, re-claiming the sociability of academic networks which have 
become spaces of “relentless competition and ostentatious display” and “seizing back the 
enjoyment of the scholarly process of reading, research and writing”.  
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